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Wikipedia English, Falun Gong: Part 2

[edit] Qigong and beyond Falun Gong originally surfaced in the institutional field of alternative Chinese science, a field "insulated from the spaces formally acknowledged as institutionalized science in Western countries". [34] Ian Johnson described how "Falun Gong positions itself as a kind of Über-science, something that is modern but even better than modern. "[35] Johnson suggests that while initially Falun Gong laid emphasis on health benefits, over time "the philosophical teachings of Truth, Goodness and Forbearance began to take on more importance." He writes that in the context of Falun Gong, these principles require people to live "upright lives." A traditional morality—what Ownby calls "popular fundamentalism," a supposed return to moral values that numerous Chinese "feel have been lost in the rush to modernisation." Li sought to develop a greater history, theory and meaning behind cultivation. Ownby delineates the following discourses: the suffering body which holds the possibility of freedom from illness and physical suffering; limitless human potential where physical transformation is chiefly effected by moral practice; and exile and return concerning world creation, degeneration, and salvation/renewal. [4] Johnson describes Falun Gong as “the next logical step in qigong's development”, writing that “while firmly stating that Falun Gong was not a religion, Master Li drew on traditional religions for terminology and symbols.” The term “Falun” means Dharma Wheel, or Wheel of Law, a traditional Buddhist concept. The imagery used includes Buddhist swastikas and Taoist t'ai chi (yin-yang) symbols. Andrew P. Kipnis said that qigong may seem to be religious to laymen in the West because it deals with spiritual matters. As many Falun Gong concepts can be traced to Buddhism and Taoism, it may seem even more like a religion to the outsider.

Richard Madsen, a professor of sociology at the University of California, however, says "among the Falun Dafa practitioners I have met are Chinese scientists with doctorates from prestigious American universities who claim that modern physics (for example, superstring theory) and biology (specifically the pineal gland's functioning) provide a scientific basis for their beliefs. From their point of view, Falun Dafa is knowledge rather than religion, a new form of science rather than faith." [36] [edit] Beginnings Li Hongzhi lectures on Falun Dafa at the UN General Assembly Hall, Geneva, 1998 According to the biography which appeared as an appendix to Zhuan Falun , Li Hongzhi had been taught ways of "cultivation practice" ( xiulian ) by several masters of the Dao and Buddhist schools of thought from a very young age. This biography says that he was trained by Quan Jue, the 10th Heir to the Great Law of the Buddha School, at age four. He was then trained by a Taoist master at age eight. This master left him at age twelve, and he was then trained by a master of the Great Way School with the Taoist alias of True Taoist , who came from the Changbai Mountains. [37] Falun Gong was introduced to the public by Li Hongzhi on May 13, 1992, in Changchun, Jilin. [38] Invited by qigong organizations from each area, Li traveled to almost all major cities in China from 1992 to 1994 to teach the practice. For the first few years of spreading Falun Gong, Li was granted several awards by Chinese governmental organizations to encourage him to continue promoting what was then considered to be a wholesome practice. [39] According to Professor Scott Lowe, Chair of Philosophy and Religious Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire until 1999 Falun Gong had "excellent public credibility" in China. "Practitioners talked enthusiastically of the benefits Falun Gong had brought to their lives, and this functioned as a powerful recruiting tool, especially within families and circles of friends. "[40] University of Montreal scholar David Ownby noted that neither Li nor Falun Gong were particularly controversial in the beginning. [41] Li became an "instant star of the qigong movement," with his practice method celebrated at the Beijing Oriental Health Expos of both 1992 and 1993. Falun Gong was welcomed into the Scientific Qigong Research Association, which sponsored and helped organise many of Li's activities between 1992 and 1994, including the 54 large-scale lectures given throughout China in most major cities to a total audience of 20,000. The scale of the activities was unprecedented at that time.

After teaching publicly in Changchun, Li began to make his ideas more widely accessible and affordable, charging less than other qigong systems for lectures, tapes, and books. [11] On 4 January 1995 Zhuan Falun , the main book on Falun Gong, was published and became a best-seller in China. Before 1999, people learned Falun Gong by word of mouth, and it was usually practiced in the morning in parks like many other forms of exercise in China. [11] It attracted many retired persons, factory workers, farmers, state enterprise managers, entrepreneurs, intellectuals, and students. [42] In 1994, Falun Gong was taught at the Chinese consulate in New York as part of the Party's "cultural propaganda to the West", alongside Chinese silk craft and cooking. [43] The consulate at that time also set up Falun Gong clubs at MIT and Columbia University which are active to this day. Starting in 1995, Li himself taught the practice outside of China, chairing a series of conferences at the Chinese embassy in Paris, upon invitation by China's ambassador to France, according to David Ownby. [27][43] [edit] Ideological and social context Group practice in China before the onset of persecution in July 1999 Yuezhi Zhao opines that Falun Gong's spread in China in the 1990s "reflected the profound contradictions of the Communist Party's technocratic-oriented modernization drive. "[25] Falun Gong's rise, she says, was responding to the deep and widespread ideological and identity crises that followed the 1989 suppression of an elite-led pro-democracy movement. In the early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping called for an end to debates about the political and social meaning of the economic reforms, urging the populace to participate in commercialism and the pursuit of material wealth. Falun Gong, in contrast, writes Zhao, "insisted on the search for meaning and called for a radical transcendence of materialism in both the mundane and philosophical senses. "[44] Falun Gong taken in this context is a Chinese manifestation of "a worldwide backlash against capitalist modernity and a testimony to the importance of meaning..."[44] Though it is grounded in Chinese cultural traditions and responds to unique post-1989 Chinese realities, Zhao says it also addresses universal concerns, "asking humanity to take a 'fresh look' at itself and re-examine its dominant value system. It is partly for this reason that Falun Gong appeals to some non-Chinese people in the West." She says that while Chinese authorities condemn Falun Gong as having "fallen prey to premodern superstitions," the practice actually "articulates a mixture of premodern, modern, and postmodern sensibilities. "[44] In Zhao's view, Falun Gong has established a 'resistance identity', resisting prevailing pursuits of wealth, power, scientific rationality, "and indeed, the entire value system associated with the project of modernization... Li Hongzhi addresses precisely the actors and aspects of subjectivity bruised by the ruthless march of Chinese modernity... and provides an alternative meaning system within which individuals can come to terms with their experience. The multiple unfolding struggles over this resistance identity match, both in speed and intensity, the wider social transformation in China. "[44] In a reversal from the 1989 outpouring of desire for political participation, many Chinese turned to Falun Gong precisely because they saw it as "an apolitical response to their individual and social concerns. By focusing on self-cultivation and individual moral salvation, and by urging its members to take lightly or give up 'attachments' to the desires, ambitions, and sentimentality that ordinarily rule modern human life, Falun Gong is reactive, defensive, and politically conservative. "[44] Zhao regards the discipline as a form of religious fundamentalism, and is subsequently not "a purveyor of 'a social project'". Yet, she says, it has turned out to be "the most politicized and highly mobilized form of social contestation in post-1989 China." No other disenfranchised social group has staged a mass protest near Zhongnanhai, she says. And while the post-Mao Chinese state attempted to avert ideological struggles, "[the state] ended up having to wage a Maoist-style ideological campaign against the movement. Such is the dialectic of China's 'economic' reforms. "[44] Scott Lowe reports in a study of an internet survey he conducted, published in Nova Religio , that practitioners understood the reason for Falun Gong's rapid growth within China to be related to "family ties and community relationships," which, he says, still retain great power. [40] In this context, "whenever someone discovers something good, they automatically wish to pass it on to their family and friends." He says the "tremendously positive" word-of-mouth generated by practitioners naturally led to the rapid spread of the teachings within close-knit Chinese communities. [40] The Economist asserts that much of Falun Gong's success in the 1990s was due to claims that it could heal without costly medicine, as many citizens had lost medical benefits and services due to changing economic conditions. [45] Some in China maintained that Falun Gong was the most popular qigong practice in the country, and that many professors from Peking University practiced the exercises every day on the campus grounds until the crackdown in 1999. [46] While Lowe acknowledges sociological "macro-issues," such as economic insecurity, free time, the collapse of moral standards, worries about health and medical care, the desire for existential certitude, and other factors as explanations for Falun Gong's rise, he suggests these were secondary, if not completely irrelevant, to the thinking of the individuals who took up Falun Gong practice. [40] Falun Gong appeals to individuals on several levels of understanding, he says. "For beginners, health benefits seem to be a primary concern. Over time, as good health comes to be a given and as their study of Master Li's books deepens, the metaphysical system of Falun Gong seems to take precedence as cultivators work to shed their attachments and move to higher levels..."[40] Over time, followers appear to find in the teachings an "intricate, orderly, and internally consistent understanding of the cosmos," he writes. Other qigong practices were unable to provide "clear, unambiguous explanations of life's deepest mysteries" and such a "complete and intellectually satisfying picture of the universe," as practitioners see it, he says. [40]

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[edit] Qigong and beyond

Falun Gong originally surfaced in the institutional field of alternative Chinese science, a field "insulated from the spaces formally acknowledged as institutionalized science in Western countries".[34] Ian Johnson described how "Falun Gong positions itself as a kind of Über-science, something that is modern but even better than modern."[35]

Johnson suggests that while initially Falun Gong laid emphasis on health benefits, over time "the philosophical teachings of Truth, Goodness and Forbearance began to take on more importance." He writes that in the context of Falun Gong, these principles require people to live "upright lives." A traditional morality—what Ownby calls "popular fundamentalism," a supposed return to moral values that numerous Chinese "feel have been lost in the rush to modernisation."

Li sought to develop a greater history, theory and meaning behind cultivation. Ownby delineates the following discourses: the suffering body which holds the possibility of freedom from illness and physical suffering; limitless human potential where physical transformation is chiefly effected by moral practice; and exile and return concerning world creation, degeneration, and salvation/renewal.[4] Johnson describes Falun Gong as “the next logical step in qigong's development”, writing that “while firmly stating that Falun Gong was not a religion, Master Li drew on traditional religions for terminology and symbols.” The term “Falun” means Dharma Wheel, or Wheel of Law, a traditional Buddhist concept. The imagery used includes Buddhist swastikas and Taoist t'ai chi (yin-yang) symbols.

Andrew P. Kipnis said that qigong may seem to be religious to laymen in the West because it deals with spiritual matters. As many Falun Gong concepts can be traced to Buddhism and Taoism, it may seem even more like a religion to the outsider.

Richard Madsen, a professor of sociology at the University of California, however, says "among the Falun Dafa practitioners I have met are Chinese scientists with doctorates from prestigious American universities who claim that modern physics (for example, superstring theory) and biology (specifically the pineal gland's functioning) provide a scientific basis for their beliefs. From their point of view, Falun Dafa is knowledge rather than religion, a new form of science rather than faith." [36]

 

[edit] Beginnings

Li Hongzhi lectures on Falun Dafa at the UN General Assembly Hall, Geneva, 1998

According to the biography which appeared as an appendix to Zhuan Falun, Li Hongzhi had been taught ways of "cultivation practice" (xiulian) by several masters of the Dao and Buddhist schools of thought from a very young age. This biography says that he was trained by Quan Jue, the 10th Heir to the Great Law of the Buddha School, at age four. He was then trained by a Taoist master at age eight. This master left him at age twelve, and he was then trained by a master of the Great Way School with the Taoist alias of True Taoist, who came from the Changbai Mountains.[37]

Falun Gong was introduced to the public by Li Hongzhi on May 13, 1992, in Changchun, Jilin.[38] Invited by qigong organizations from each area, Li traveled to almost all major cities in China from 1992 to 1994 to teach the practice. For the first few years of spreading Falun Gong, Li was granted several awards by Chinese governmental organizations to encourage him to continue promoting what was then considered to be a wholesome practice.[39]

According to Professor Scott Lowe, Chair of Philosophy and Religious Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire until 1999 Falun Gong had "excellent public credibility" in China. "Practitioners talked enthusiastically of the benefits Falun Gong had brought to their lives, and this functioned as a powerful recruiting tool, especially within families and circles of friends."[40]

University of Montreal scholar David Ownby noted that neither Li nor Falun Gong were particularly controversial in the beginning.[41] Li became an "instant star of the qigong movement," with his practice method celebrated at the Beijing Oriental Health Expos of both 1992 and 1993. Falun Gong was welcomed into the Scientific Qigong Research Association, which sponsored and helped organise many of Li's activities between 1992 and 1994, including the 54 large-scale lectures given throughout China in most major cities to a total audience of 20,000. The scale of the activities was unprecedented at that time.

After teaching publicly in Changchun, Li began to make his ideas more widely accessible and affordable, charging less than other qigong systems for lectures, tapes, and books.[11] On 4 January 1995 Zhuan Falun, the main book on Falun Gong, was published and became a best-seller in China. Before 1999, people learned Falun Gong by word of mouth, and it was usually practiced in the morning in parks like many other forms of exercise in China.[11] It attracted many retired persons, factory workers, farmers, state enterprise managers, entrepreneurs, intellectuals, and students.[42]

In 1994, Falun Gong was taught at the Chinese consulate in New York as part of the Party's "cultural propaganda to the West", alongside Chinese silk craft and cooking.[43] The consulate at that time also set up Falun Gong clubs at MIT and Columbia University which are active to this day. Starting in 1995, Li himself taught the practice outside of China, chairing a series of conferences at the Chinese embassy in Paris, upon invitation by China's ambassador to France, according to David Ownby.[27][43]

 

[edit] Ideological and social context

Group practice in China before the onset of persecution in July 1999

Yuezhi Zhao opines that Falun Gong's spread in China in the 1990s "reflected the profound contradictions of the Communist Party's technocratic-oriented modernization drive."[25] Falun Gong's rise, she says, was responding to the deep and widespread ideological and identity crises that followed the 1989 suppression of an elite-led pro-democracy movement. In the early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping called for an end to debates about the political and social meaning of the economic reforms, urging the populace to participate in commercialism and the pursuit of material wealth. Falun Gong, in contrast, writes Zhao, "insisted on the search for meaning and called for a radical transcendence of materialism in both the mundane and philosophical senses."[44]

Falun Gong taken in this context is a Chinese manifestation of "a worldwide backlash against capitalist modernity and a testimony to the importance of meaning..."[44] Though it is grounded in Chinese cultural traditions and responds to unique post-1989 Chinese realities, Zhao says it also addresses universal concerns, "asking humanity to take a 'fresh look' at itself and re-examine its dominant value system. It is partly for this reason that Falun Gong appeals to some non-Chinese people in the West."

She says that while Chinese authorities condemn Falun Gong as having "fallen prey to premodern superstitions," the practice actually "articulates a mixture of premodern, modern, and postmodern sensibilities."[44] In Zhao's view, Falun Gong has established a 'resistance identity', resisting prevailing pursuits of wealth, power, scientific rationality, "and indeed, the entire value system associated with the project of modernization... Li Hongzhi addresses precisely the actors and aspects of subjectivity bruised by the ruthless march of Chinese modernity... and provides an alternative meaning system within which individuals can come to terms with their experience. The multiple unfolding struggles over this resistance identity match, both in speed and intensity, the wider social transformation in China."[44]

In a reversal from the 1989 outpouring of desire for political participation, many Chinese turned to Falun Gong precisely because they saw it as "an apolitical response to their individual and social concerns. By focusing on self-cultivation and individual moral salvation, and by urging its members to take lightly or give up 'attachments' to the desires, ambitions, and sentimentality that ordinarily rule modern human life, Falun Gong is reactive, defensive, and politically conservative."[44] Zhao regards the discipline as a form of religious fundamentalism, and is subsequently not "a purveyor of 'a social project'". Yet, she says, it has turned out to be "the most politicized and highly mobilized form of social contestation in post-1989 China." No other disenfranchised social group has staged a mass protest near Zhongnanhai, she says. And while the post-Mao Chinese state attempted to avert ideological struggles, "[the state] ended up having to wage a Maoist-style ideological campaign against the movement. Such is the dialectic of China's 'economic' reforms."[44]

Scott Lowe reports in a study of an internet survey he conducted, published in Nova Religio, that practitioners understood the reason for Falun Gong's rapid growth within China to be related to "family ties and community relationships," which, he says, still retain great power.[40] In this context, "whenever someone discovers something good, they automatically wish to pass it on to their family and friends." He says the "tremendously positive" word-of-mouth generated by practitioners naturally led to the rapid spread of the teachings within close-knit Chinese communities.[40]

The Economist asserts that much of Falun Gong's success in the 1990s was due to claims that it could heal without costly medicine, as many citizens had lost medical benefits and services due to changing economic conditions.[45] Some in China maintained that Falun Gong was the most popular qigong practice in the country, and that many professors from Peking University practiced the exercises every day on the campus grounds until the crackdown in 1999.[46]

While Lowe acknowledges sociological "macro-issues," such as economic insecurity, free time, the collapse of moral standards, worries about health and medical care, the desire for existential certitude, and other factors as explanations for Falun Gong's rise, he suggests these were secondary, if not completely irrelevant, to the thinking of the individuals who took up Falun Gong practice.[40] Falun Gong appeals to individuals on several levels of understanding, he says. "For beginners, health benefits seem to be a primary concern. Over time, as good health comes to be a given and as their study of Master Li's books deepens, the metaphysical system of Falun Gong seems to take precedence as cultivators work to shed their attachments and move to higher levels..."[40] Over time, followers appear to find in the teachings an "intricate, orderly, and internally consistent understanding of the cosmos," he writes. Other qigong practices were unable to provide "clear, unambiguous explanations of life's deepest mysteries" and such a "complete and intellectually satisfying picture of the universe," as practitioners see it, he says.[40]